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(1) Introduction
Elections have still to be held.  I intend to make no prediction about who is likely to win.  I
am happy to leave that question to electoral pundits.  Rather I am going to attempt to say
something about the current substance and trends in US foreign policy and then ask what
directions these might take under a new George Bush Jr Republican administration on the
one hand or a Democratic administration under Al Gore on the other.  In similar vein I do not
propose that this presentation represent a cook's tour (no pun intended) of the US position on
a range issue-specific hot spots in world affairs.  That can be left to the security specialists.
Rather I want to look at the larger structural questions that will help determine the form and
direction of US foreign policy in general, irrespective of the political stripe of the
administration.
The biggest of these questions is clearly the context of a post Cold War system that has yet to
emerge in any clear form other than to call it the 'age of globalisation'.  I am going to say
something about the dreaded G word--this thing called globalisation--in as much as it
determines, and in turn is determined by, US foreign policy behaviour.  Either presidential
candidates will have to deal with this context on coming to office.  They will inherit similar
constraints and problems, in all probability adopt similar policy responses and, it should be
said, with no guarantee of securing superior outcomes to the Clinton administrations of the
last eight years.
The Clinton legacy tells us much about what to expect after November 2000, so I will look at
this from both Republican and Democratic perspectives.  The current spin that both sides are
putting on this legacy is instructive for our deliberations today.  Needless to say, the
competing views of the Clinton legacy form the basis of current Republican and Democratic
thinking for future foreign policy.  However, flagging my overall conclusion at the outset of
this presentation, notwithstanding some inevitable atmospheric and stylistic change of
direction, we should expect overall continuity rather than dramatic change to characterise US
foreign policy after the elections.
But there is some issue-specific product differentiation to be identified between Bush and
Gore.  Where the election outcome will make a difference to US foreign policy is in the
responses of a new administration to several key policy issues in the international economic
3
and politico-security domains; especially in their respective attitudes towards the question
of how we 'manage' or 'govern' globalisation at the international level.  It is here that attitudes
towards the international institutions, especially the IMF, World Bank, WTO and regional
organisations such as the EU, NAFTA and APEC will become important.  Similarly, some
product differentiation towards several key politico-security relationships--notably those with
Russia, China and Europe (NATO)--are likely to emerge under different administrations
(2) Globalisation is Different.  And for the USA Too.
The globalised era is different from any we have previously known.  For sure, there are
substantial similarities with previous eras of economic and technological change, especially
the end of the nineteenth century.3   But it is not simply more of the same, only this time
more so.4  We are only just beginning to appreciate the impact of the information and
communications revolutions (the ICTR) on international relations in general and on
diplomatic and foreign policy practice in particular.  Globalisation, notwithstanding strong
historical parallels and the cliched nature of many descriptions of the 'new economy', is
different to earlier times.  These changes cannot be discussed in detail here save to note that
while in simple percentage terms, trade may not be much more liberalised and in legal terms
finance not much more deregulated than prior to 1914, the volumes of activity, the number of
actors involved, the speed at which transactions takes place, and the impact that they can
have globally (often beyond the policy control of traditional state centred bureaucratic elites)
are sufficiently qualitatively different from 100 years ago to allow us to think of them as
representing revolutionary change.5
The key issue for my presentation today, however, is the role of the United States in the
globalisation process and its impact on its foreign policy.  Yet at the risk of one more
                                                
3 See Kevin H. O'Rourke and J. J. Williamson and, Globalisation and History: The Evolution of the Nineteenth-
Century Atlantic Economy, Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1999; Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye,
'Globalization: What's New? What's Not?', Foreign Policy, Spring 2000, 104-19.
4  Richard Higgott and Simon Reich, (1998) ''Globalisation and Sites of Conflict: Towards Definition and
Taxonomy', Working Paper No. 1, University of Warwick, Economic and Social Research Council Centre for
the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation, available at www.csgr.org
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historical analogy, the position of the United States is vastly different to 100 years ago too;
or indeed even prior to the end of the Cold War just a little more than a decade ago when
Paul Kennedy was making huge (indeed inordinate) mileage out of his simplistic historical
comparisons between the collapse of previous empires on the one hand and the pending
demise of the USA as a hegemonic power on the other.6  In fact, rather than 'imperial over-
stretch'--Kennedy's term for describing the US condition--we have seen a consolidation of US
preponderance.  This does mean that we should accept the worst hubristic tendencies of
Francis Fukayama's proclamation of 'the End of History'.7
Rather we should recognise the degree to which the collapse of the Soviet Empire and the
end of the Cold War has seen the US come to occupy a position of what Stephen Walt calls
'unprecedented preponderance'.8  According to World Bank figures, the US with 4 percent of
the world's population produces 27 percent of the world's economic output (22 percent when
adjusted for PPP).9  With 4 times the US population Japan and China produce less than half
that amount.  The US also leads the way in scientific and technological research and has a
defence budget equal to 'the next six countries combined'.10  The US has been strengthened
not only by its position as the prototype 'new economy' in the era of the ICTR, but also by the
under-performance of the other parts of the world; notably Japan, post 1997 crisis Asia and,
albeit to a lesser extent, Europe.  These factors given the US a substantial lead over all other
competitors.
In addition to its brut economic and military power, US hegemony is also under written by
what Joseph Nye calls its 'soft power'.11   In his now ell understood argument, hard power is
exercised through economic and military statecraft; soft powers arise from the ability to
                                                                                                                                                       
5 See David Held et al, Global Transformations, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1999.  Richard Higgott and A J
Payne, 'Towards a New Political Economy of Globalisation? in Richard Higgott and Anthony Payne (eds) The
New Political Economy of Globalisation, Volume I, Aldershot, Edward Elgar, 2000.
6 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Decline of the Great Powers, New York: Random House, 1990.
7 Frances Fukayama, The End of History and the Last Man, New York: Basic Books, 1992.
8  Stephen M. Walt, 'Two Cheers for Clinton's Foreign Policy', Foreign Affairs, 79 (2) 2000: p. 64.
9 The Financial Times, 23, December, 1999, p. 16.
10 Walt, p. 64.
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attract rather than to coerce.  Nye, and many others of both a Republican and Democratic
persuasion, hold American values to be the principal instrument of soft power.  Under
conditions of economic globalisation the values that represent the essence of this soft power
are thought to be the growing global impact of the neo-liberal understanding of trade
liberalisation, financial deregulation and corporate governance, combined with a Lockean
individualist understanding of democracy.  In tangible form examples of the instruments of
soft power, are to be found in the socialisation processes undergone by more than half a
million foreign students that come to the US each year (most of whom go home impressed)
and the cultural influences of Hollywood and Macworld.
The implications of this unrivalled strategic position are of the utmost significance for an
understanding of what US foreign policy might look like over the next few years.
Notwithstanding what they might have done with it, the makers of recent US foreign policy
have had a freedom of economic and politico-strategic action unthinkable during the era of
Cold War discipline.  Indeed, it is argued by some realists we would soon come to miss the
Cold War12 and that its very absence has led to an increasing lack of discipline in US foreign
policy in the closing decade of the twentieth century as those ties that held it closely to its
allies have gradually loosened.
Of course, such freedoms are not without their disadvantages.  The US cannot wield power in
an unrestrained manner for fear of alienating other major actors in the system.  I deed,
negative responses to US policy over the closing years of the twentieth century can be seen
not only with Russian and Asian opinion13, but also amongst traditional post world war two
allies such as France and Germany, who consider that on a number of occasions US
preponderance under conditions of globalisation has led to non-cooperative behaviour on the
part of the Clinton administration that has damaged the post Cold War consensus.  They
argue that the unilateral US power, especially in the economic domain, is not conducive to
the enhancement of global cooperation at this point in time.  French President, Jacques
                                                                                                                                                       
11 Joseph S Nye, Bound to Lead, New York: Basic Books, 1990.
12 John Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold war, International Security, 15 (1)
1991.
13  See Richard Higgott, The Asian Financial Crisis: A Study in the International Politics of Resentment, New
Political Economy, 3 (3) 1998.
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Chirac, commenting on the growth of US 'hyperpower', has been critical of what he sees as
the increasing recourse to isolationism and unilateralism on the part of the US.
This lack of cooperation and indeed leadership of the global economic and security orders is,
realists and liberals alike would argue, not surprising.  There is little that the US currently
wants from the international system that it cannot get from unilateral action.  In security
terms, the US does not face those kinds of geopolitical challenges that were ever present
throughout the twentieth century.  Such 'enemies, if we can use that term, that the US
currently has--Iraq, North Korea, Yugoslavia--while vexatious, are hardly capable of
mounting a serious threat to US security.  In the economic domain, the international
institutions do not provide the sort of compliance with US opinion that it feels they should.
As a consequence, the international institutions rank low in a US order of priority.  Their
reform, deemed so important in other parts of the world, is secondary to US interest and
diffuse reciprocity as the guiding norm of US international economic diplomacy for much of
the post world war two era has given way to a greater preference for specific reciprocity
during the Clinton period.
This position is reflected in a further factor arising from US 'preponderance.  Throughout the
1990s foreign policy matters have fallen even lower down the list of interests of US public
opinion than has even normally been the case.  George Bush Jr's famous inability to name
three Heads of State is unlikely to prove an electoral handicap when, even amongst those
members of the wider US community that actually have views on foreign policy questions,
support for an activist foreign policy has declined.14  This view is reinforced by the
diminished concerns about issues such as defence spending, foreign aid; the salience of
international institutions such as they UN and World Bank; and support for traditional allies
such as NATO, Taiwan and South Korea.  This too should come as no surprise given that
Clinton ran on his now (in)famous domestically driven--'Its the economy stupid'--ticket at the
last election.  The next two sections consider the competing views of the Clinton legacy.  The
principle interest in international matters amongst the wider US public is primarily its
concern over the impact of globalisation on their own welfare and job security.15
                                                
14  For a details of a recent poll on the foreign policy interests of the US population see Walt, p. 65.
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(3) The Clinton Legacy: The Republican View
From a Republican perspective the general charge levelled against the two Clinton
administrations is that they have squandered the political benefits of 'winning' the Cold War.
They have been uncertain how to use America's unprecedented economic and military
superiority.  As a former Under Secretary of State to Bush and Reagan argues, the Clinton
administration has been found to be'...hesitating, then over committing and regularly failing
to match means with ends.'16  While globalisation (especially the deregulation of trade, the
liberalisation of financial markets and the privatisation of state assets) the world over has
increasingly reflected a US neo-liberal agenda for how the world economic order should
evolve, this has not also been reflected by a similar US ability to define a 'new
internationalism' in the global politico-security order.
Clinton, they say, has lacked a commitment and adherence to his own stated priorities.  For
example, rhetorical commitment to international trade reform under written by principles of
free trade have not been matched in practice. There are a range of trade specific issues-areas
identified by the Republicans where this has been the case: as in the demand for managed
trade relations with Japan. and in the failed attempt to launch a new round of multilateral
trade negotiations (MTN) at Seattle in November 1999.  While there are several ways to
explain the fiasco that was Seattle--paralysis in the WTO following the difficulties of
appointing a successor to Renato Ruggiero and the less than stunning diplomatic skill of his
successor, Mike Moore; the increasingly effective opposition of the NGOS to a new MTN;
the opposition of many developing country delegations to what they saw as their
marginalisation from the decision making in the WTO talks process themselves--but, the
major explanation offered by the Republicans was Clinton's unwillingness to alienate a range
of domestic protectionist constituencies, especially the unions, within the USA.  Leave aside
here the question of whether the Republicans would have done it better or differently, the
charge that Clinton played politics with the WTO trade agenda has substance.  Moreover, it is
consistent with his behaviour on other policy issues.
                                                                                                                                                       
15 Aaron Bernstein, 'Backlash: Behind the Anxiety over Globalization', Business Week, 24 April, 2000; see also
Gary Burtless, Robert Z. Lawrence, Robert E. Litan, Robert J. Shapiro, Globaphobia: Confronting Fears About
Open Trade: Washington: Brookings, 1998
16 see Robert Zoellick, 'A Republican Foreign Policy', Foreign Affairs, 79 (1) 2000, pps 63-78.
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Second, deeds have not matched words for Republicans in the security domain either.  In
situations such as Kosovo, the Clinton Administration, they argue, despite overwhelming
military superiority has been too tardy in using the big stick, as opposed to simply waving it,
with rogue states such as Yugoslavia and Iraq.  As such they have failed to provide political
and security leadership to US allies and coalition partners in a manner dissimilar to George
Bush Senior's success in the Gulf War.17  So much for Clinton's promise of 'Assertive
Multilateralism' they argue.
Republican's also identify a gap in the relationship between Clinton's strategy thinking and
his operational response to relationships with other great powers.  Specifically, he has been
too quick to accommodate China.  The on-again, off-again, now on-again attitude towards
Chinese membership of the WTO has led not only to confusion and resentment, but has
undermined efforts to instil an urgency in China to undertake structural economic reform--for
which read 'opening its economy to the US'.   Similarly, he has been too willing to ignore
corruption and cronyism in Russia, the impact of which has been to undermine the
intellectual strength and popular political support within Russia for the 'free market model'.
As a consequence, democratic reform has been hindered rather than helped.
Finally--ignoring the fact that it was largely ever thus in the USA, and with no seeming sense
of their own political interests--Republicans argue that Clinton's foreign policy has been
driven by naked domestic political calculation.  The outcome, only to be expected say
Republicans, has been a damage to US international credibility and a growing resentment
amongst its partners towards US foreign policy positions.  Thus, by way of important
rationalisation, they have been entitled to use their Congress onal majority to suspend bi-
partisan support for foreign policy and await the arrival of a Republican president.
(4) The Clinton Legacy: The Democrat View
Needless to say, the Gore Campaign is anxious to demonstrate blue water between its agenda
and that of the current president.  Gore wants to be seen as his own man; Republican attempts
                                                
17  Zoellick, p. 66.  This is, of course, a selective reading of US policy in the Gulf War.  See Andrew Cooper,
Richard Higgott and Kim Nossal, ‘Bound to Follow? Leadership and Followership in the Gulf Conflict’
Political Science Quarterly. 106 (3) 1991: 391-410.
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to depict the 1990s as the 'Clinton-Gore era' a  not working.  However, Gore's people do
offer a defence of foreign policy under Clinton.  In so doing, they set much greater store by
the structural constraints that have conditioned Clinton foreign policy than do the
Republicans who, not surprisingly, would want to attribute a much greater degree of agency
(that is freedom for truly autonomous policy action) to the Clinton administration than is
perhaps the case.  The political calculation in this  style of criticism is to be expected, but I
think we can go analytically beyond this narrow judgement.
Republican critiques fail to appreciate, or at least are unwilling to acknowledge, how overall
changes in international relations under conditions of globalisation and the end of the Cold
War have indeed affected US foreign policy options in a number of ways.  Firstly, and most
notably, while the US has been a major spur to, and beneficiary of the economic liberalisation
and financial deregulation that has characterised the global economy in the last quarter of the
twentieth century, it too has been affected, if less significantly maybe, in ways similar to less
powerful nations by the fundamental change in the relationship between state power and
market authority.18
Secondly, Republican critiques fail to take account of the degree to which they, themselves
have constrained presidential foreign policy making capability in a range of areas--by
Congressional budget cutting actions for international affairs or tying decisions on key
foreign policy issues to domestic political considerations.  While Clinton's handling of
Congress has been inept on a number of important foreign policy occasions, he has had to
live in his second term with a hostile majority 'nativist' Republican Congress--to which it is
claimed two thirds of those elected in 1994 did not even possess passports19--and who not
only saw no priority for foreign policy concerns but instead a clear short term political
advantage to be gained by obstructionist behaviour.
Moreover, Democrats argue, that in his commitment to encourage democracy abroad and
intervention against major abusers of human rights (no matter how ineffectively at times)
Clinton has, in a traditionally bi-partisan way, aspired to advance a world order in keeping
                                                
18  See Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
19  Walt, p. 65.
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with American values.  Similarly, the Clinton administration has, again whether judged
successful by a Republican opposition or not, maintained a forward military presence in
Europe and Asia as a deliberate strategy to assist in the keeping of the peace.
Notwithstanding the ethnocentric and rose-tinted nature of his reading of the Clinton legacy
(a reading that would be challenged in most European capitals) Walt notes:
'In Europe, the Clinton administration has held NATO together despite growing
centrifugal tendencies and intense policy disputes...masterfully orchestrated
NATO's expansion into Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic ... [and] ...
guided NATO through its military interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo, despite
numerous inter alliance disputes. ... These achievements are especially
impressive considering how hard it is now to keep the alliance together.20
In somewhat less ethnocentric vein, Walt does concede that the loosening of US influence in
Europe may be as much to do with a growing recognition amongst European policy elites that
they need to take more control over their own regional security concerns than it is any
disinterest or ineffectiveness on the part of US policy.  Simi arly, his reading of the
relationship with China is one that sees the cooperation that has developed, slow as it may be,
is in effect the best that could be expected under the circumstances, especially given the
extreme sensitivity of the Chinese leadership to its status as a major regional and
international power.
On the other hand, Walt's reading of the deteriorating relationship with Russia is not
dissimilar to that of the Republicans.  He does, however, see a range of mitigating
circumstances; notably the failure of the Russian political community to deal seriously with
their own problems.  As he correctly notes, there is a limit to what can be done within the
boundaries of another sovereign country.21  For all his faults, it is difficult not to see Yeltsin
as better than any of the alternatives on offer at the time throughout the second half of the
1990s.  Supporters of the Democratic foreign policy record under Clinton would also point to
several other achievements that can be laid at Clinton's door; perhaps most notably the 1997
Chemical Weapons Convention.
                                                
20  Walt, p. 67.
21  Walt, pp. 68-70.
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(5) Weighing Republican and Democratic Judgements of the Clinton Legacy
The previous two sections provide synopses of the competing judgements of the Clinton
administration currently in play in the run up to the November presidential election.  It is
difficult to secure an objective analysis of the Clinton era from two such partisan
perspectives.  Sitting here in London and away from the political melee, however, we should
be able to do better.  Indeed, in preparing this presentation I have tried to identify the core
that is common to both analytical perspectives on Clinton.  It is to be found, to my mind at
least, in the tragic disjuncture between the rhetoric and reality of his time in office.  The
initial ideological vision and aspirations at the beginning of his administration--especially in
his recognition that traditional understandings of power politics were not appropriate to a new
'post Cold War era' and in his stated desire to establish an 'assertive multilateralism'--contrast
sharply with the rapid dissent into more conventional realpolitik.  As Walt notes:
'Under Clinton, the United States consolidated its Cold War victory by bringing
three former Warsaw Pact members into its own alliance.  It shored up East Asia
and readied itself for a possible competition with a rising China while
encouraging Beijing to accept a status quo that favoured the United States.  It
rejected the land mines treaty and opposed the creation of an international
criminal court while moving steadily closer to NMD.  It forced allies to bear a
greater share of the burden in Europe and East Asia while insisting on leading
both alliances.  And, together with its NATO allies, it asserted the right to
intervene in the sovereign territory of other states even without Security Council
authorisation.  Clinton may cloak US policy in the rhetoric of "world order" and
general global interests, but it defining essence remains the unilateral exercise of
sovereign power'22 (my emphasis)
In short, when thinking of what policy might look like under a new presidency, the
presidency of William Jefferson Clinton will be a hard act in realpolitik for any Republican
administration to outflank.
The other defining characteristic of Clinton's tenure in office has been the short t rm
domestic political instrumentalism of his foreign policy.  Notwithstanding that the
Republicans have not made it easy for him, Clinton has invariably taken advantage of US
preponderance to secure the short term domestic gain rather than underwrite a longer term
international interest.  Moreover, the urge to secure advantage in the domestic partisan
                                                
22 Walt, p. 78.
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political battle has not always proved successful; most notably in his loss of fast track trade
negotiating authority (rare indeed for a president), the defeat by Congress of his proposal for
a Comprehensive Test Ban treaty in 1999 and in his appeal to domestic opinion that
scuppered the Seattle WTO Ministerials.
Indeed, it is in his attitude towards multilateral institutions, as even supporters such as Walt
are prepared to concede, that Clinton demonstrates better than anywhere else the degree to
which he departed idealism for realpolitik..  As the remainder of this paper attempts to
demonstrate, it is a legacy that will have important longe  term implications not only for US
foreign policy but for actors other than the US in the reshaping of the governance structure of
the economic and political orders after him.
(6) Entering the Global Age? US Foreign Policy After November 2000
I have suggested that there is a mixed legacy from the Clinton era.  Republicans have been
critical of it, Democrats largely supportive.  This should come as no surprise. But to the non-
partisan observer what is interesting in the last instance, I would argue, is that the difference
between these two analyses is not as great as the competitive rhetoric suggests.  At its
bedrock, there is more realpolitik to the Clinton era than either Republicans or most
Democrats would like to concede.  Of course, realist international relations scholars and
foreign policy analysts would expect this.
'Americans do not like to think of themselves as practising realpolitik, ... [but] ...
they do like being number one. ... Clinton's strategy is hegemony on the cheap,
because that is the only strategy the American people are likely to support. ... the
Clinton administration has been well suited to an era when there is little to gain from
foreign policy and much to lose.'23
So what judgements should we draw about the potential shape of US foreign policy after the
November election from this comparative analysis of the Clinton legacy?  Again, I try to let
the words of the two parties, in the run up to the election, speak for themselves, but I first flag
my own view.
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Given the context of a continued US preponderance in the technological, economic and
politico-security domains under conditions of globalisation, given the realpolitik essence to
be found in the behaviour of the last administration, given the relative insignificance of
international affairs for the US population in general and the limited domestic political gain
to be had from it in particular--and, not withstanding current Republican assertions that they
will be different--we should, broadly speaking, expect more of the same.  I list below nine
similarities that would be at the core of post November 2000 US foreign policy irrespective
of which candidate triumphs.
(i) Both parties exhibit a liking for power and profess a strong commitment to a
fairly common understanding of what constitutes America's national interest.  To
put it crudely, and notwithstanding the difficulties of identifying the concept of a
US 'interest' after the collapse of Soviet power, both recognise that the USA has
enemies (real or imagined) against which to guard.
(ii) Both parties espouse the rhetoric of international leadership and coalition and
alliance building--if not 'assertive multilateralism'--in international relations.
While Republicans and Democrats alike might like to complain about many of
the international institutions, alliances and regimes that traverse the global
landscape, if many of them did not exist, both recognise it would be necessary to
invent them.
(iii) Both parties recognise the need to embrace the changes that are emerging as
the result of revolutions in information and communications technologies.  This
is the key change coinciding with the end of the Cold War.  Both parties
recognise that the US to-date has been the principal beneficiary of the
information revolution.  These revolutions give rise to further emerging
similarities at points (iv) through (vi) below.
(iv) Both parties recognise the growing importance of non-state actors in world
affairs (in both the corporate and the social domains.)  The need to include
MNCs and especially NGOs in foreign policy dec sion making processes, as they
take advantage of the new modes of communication to make their voices heard,
is a major change in contemporary diplomacy.
(v) Both parties recognise that finance and commerce (in that order nowadays)
will structure the security agenda in a way that distinguishes the era of
globalisation sharply from the era of the Cold War.  That is, both parties
recognise the shift in the relationship between sta e authority and market power
under conditions of globalisation and a lesser role for governmental and inter-
governmental institutions vis a vis markets.
                                                                                                                                                       
23 Walt, p. 79.
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(vi) In sociological jargon, both parties are adapting to the evolution of n tworks of
structured power and interest at the level of a global (as opposed to national)
civil society that has been an outgrowth of the communication revolutions.  Yet
again, in similar fashion to the dilemmas posed by the growth of NGOs--apart
from recognising the emergence of these networks--policy makers in both parties
are unsure exactly how to respond meaningfully to them.
(vii)  Both parties recognise that what Nye calls soft power--the power of
American ideas--in the information age can now be as important an instrument of
US hegemony as hard power of the more traditional kind.
(viii) Notwithstanding the ascendancy of neo-liberalism over the last twenty
years, both recognise that alternative understandings of capitalism and economic
management--be they a continental European 'social democratic' version or an
Asian 'developmental statist' version--still have powerful intellectual support and
empirical applications.24  As a consequence both Republicans and Democrats see
the US private sector as a powerful weapon in this remaining ideas battle; a battle
that both parties assume, as an act of faith, the US will eventually win.
(ix) Both recognise the growing disjunction between the state as the repository of
sovereignty and rule making and the deterritorialisation and increasing
importance of non traditional threats to security--such as international terrorism,
environmental degradation and organised crime (especially in the domains of
drug trafficking and money laundering).  But both are less quick to recognise the
degree to which the US is as much a cause as a victim of some of these trans-
territorial problems.
How do these broad understandings translate into concrete policy applications and, more to
the point today, into potential differences between the putative foreign policies of the two
Presidential contenders?
Notwithstanding the general areas of agreement, differences are to be found in the way that
Republicans and Democrats define national interest and the manner in which they would
wish to reconstruct the existing international system to take account of the effects of
globalisation.  Two recent s ts articles in Foreign Affairs by senior advisers to the respective
candidates capture the essence of this difference nicely.  The following analysis draws on
them to tease out some differences of view and policy.  Condoleeza Rice, strongly tipped as
Secretary of State if Bush wins, flagged the nature of a Republican understanding of national
interest in the following way:
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'[to] ... ensure that America's military can deter war, project power, and fight in
defence of its interests if deterrence fails; to promote economic growth and
political openness by extending free trade and a stable international monetary
system to all committed to those principles, including in the western hemisphere;
to renew strong and intimate relationships with allies who share American values
and can thus share the burden of promoting peace, prosperity and freedom; to
focus US energies on comprehensive relationships with big powers, particularly
Russia and China, that can and will mold the character of the international
political system; and to deal decisively with the threat of rogue regimes and
hostile powers, which is increasingly taking the forms of the potential for
terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)'.25
The language of her understanding of interest in the Foreign Affairs piece very much reflects
a traditional, security first, agenda.  By contrast three senior advisers to Al Gore (W.
Bowman Cutter, Joan Spero and Laura D'Andrea Tyson) placed much greater emphasis on
the need to respond to the structural impact of what we might call the new political economy
of globalisation.  Notwithstanding that they accept that economic interest should be
subordinate to security interests, the challenges the see facing a new American president
contrast with those of Rice.  These are:
'... first, to grasp the fundamental changes in the global economy; and second to
respond by fostering the conditions and institutions required for a world in which
the United States can remain secure and prosperous.  The central task ... is to help
develop a new system of global economic relations--a task made essential, rather
than simply desirable, by the enormous and irreversible changes now sweeping the
world.26
For the purposes of my argument, the important difference is less the subject matter than the
tenor of the language of these two templates for foreign policy after November 2000.
Democrats, as evinced by Bowman et al, are by temperament more committed to cooperative
and institutional problem solving at the international level than Republicans.  This is to be
seen best in two areas of foreign policy: (i) the differences over how to manage the
international economic order under conditions of globalisation and (ii) relations with the
                                                                                                                                                       
24 See Richard Higgott and Nicola Phillips, 'After Triumphalism: The Limits of Liberalism in Asia and Latin
America', Review of International Studies, 25 (2) 2000.
25 Condoleeza Rice, 'Promoting the National Interest' Foreign Affairs, 79 (1) 2000, 46-7
26 W. Bowman Cutter, Joan E. Spero and Laura D'Andrea Tyson, 'New World, New Deal: A Democrat
Approach to globalization', F reign Affairs, 79 (2) 2000, P. 81
16
other major global actors--in no particular order, China, Japan, Russia and the European
Union.
(i) Governing Economic Globalisation
 The Gore team, in principle at least, call for the strengthening of institutions like the IMF,
World Bank and the WTO as a way to deal with global economic problems.  It might not be
'assertive multilateralism', but multilateralism it is.  By contrast, Republicans, as forcefully
stated by Rice, are much more committed to the rhetoric of national interest and much less
interested in what she calls the consolidation of the 'illusory norms' of international
behaviour.27  While she asserts that a Republican foreign policy will be 'internationalist', she
does not define what that is, except to say that it will be grounded in 'the national interest' not
the interests of 'an illusory international community.'28
To be fair, this is not a call for isolationism per e rather than a question of how to relate to
the rest of the world.  In language reminiscent of Ronald Reagan prior to the end of the Cold
War, Bush Jr and his team are calling for engagement with the world but with a narrower
sense of national interest and in a much more unilateral manner than the Gore team.  But this
seemingly semantic difference does cast alternative policy shadows over the reform of the
international economic architecture.  To-date, Al Gore appears to say the right things on the
global governance agenda (for non Americans at least).  Republicans have much less to say.
If Gore, and his team, are to be taken at face value, he wants to move the Democrats away
from the growing recourse to unilateralist trade activity as a way to secure compliance from
other countries with US law in a range of trade related areas.  He wants to work out a strategy
and consensus for difficult and politically sensitive issues in the international trade regime,
such as services and agriculture.  The Democrats say they want new multilateral approaches
to issues like human rights, labour rights and the environment.  Indeed, the Democrats now
claim to recognise that the United States is 'disproportionately responsible'29 for ma y
environmental problems that are invariably cross border in both causes and solutions.
                                                
27 Rice, p. 48.
28 Rice, p. 62.
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Recognising that it is the absence of a multilateral international organisation to deal with
environmental problems that has caused the environmental movement to focus its challenge
on the WTO, they now identify the need to build an environment-specific regime.
Democrats thus advocate a Global Environmental Organisation to head off further damage to
trade liberalisation and to enforce environmental agreements along the lines of the Montreal
protocol to slow ozone depletion.
Given the changing structural conditions, 'global round' approaches to trade negotiations
more generally are seen by Democrats to have largely outlived their usefulness.  There are a
number of reasons for this.  Trade negotiations are more technically complex and the actors
involved more numerous and varied in their aims and aspirations.  As a consequence trade
negotiations 'in the round' are also becoming more difficult for the US to control.  But
Democrats concede that increased transparency and greater involvement of interested no
state actors in these processes are needed if the growing backlash against globalisation is to
be mitigated.  They are now of the view the WTO as not the proper forum for these issues.
But, not only in the trade domain, also in the financial domain the next Democratic president,
as his advisers argue, should 'pledge America's commitment to the World Bank and the IMF,
emphazing their importance while recognising the need for further reform'.30  As in the trade
domain, the need to engage civil society and to cope with the volatility of cross border
financial flows has become much more pressing, especially in the wake of the financial crises
of 1997-8 and the market volatility emerging from the dot.com revolution.  Indeed, a specific
regime for dealing with the impact of the digital revolution is also mooted.
The real issue for the observer of these Democratic policy pronouncements, of course, is less
the appropriateness of such positions--many of which are now deemed to be 'common sense'
positions in Europe--as much as the credibility of the Democrats to act in a manner that is
consistent with their rhetoric.  To this extent at least, Gore is damaged by his association with
Clinton; certainly with observers outside of the US if not necessarily with the wider US
population.  This is not the problem when observing the Republicans who, as yet, have said
very little on these key issues.
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For the Republicans there appears to be little more to the current global governance agenda
than making the world safe for Merrill Lynch.  They are certainly not much interested in
advancing a multilateral governance agenda of the type associated with the 'post Washington
Consensus.'31  Republican attitudes to the international financial institutions appears to be
driven more by unilateral US interest and less by the development of consensual multilateral
norms.   Even the limited concessions that Democrats now make regarding the contribution
of the US to global warming look like major concessions compared to what has been heard
from, and what might be expected under, a Republican president cum Texas oilman who,
should he win in November, will have come to office pushing cheap energy as a campaign
theme.
Moreover, for Republicans global economic reform is tied into to the security agenda in a
much tighter way than for the Democrats.  Rice demonstrates the strong Republican concern
for what she sees as the neglect of the armed forces.  There will be a clear priority for major
force modernisation under a Republican administration that is not as strongly articulated by
the Democrats.  Rhetorically, Gore is greener and more institutionalist than Bush; while Bush
is more hawkish than Gore.  This can be seen in the competing views of the two teams on
great power relationships.
(ii) Great Power Relationships  
Republicans will tie the trade agenda to its politico-security agenda with China much more
than will the Gore team who have indicated a desire to continue Clinton's policy of
constructive engagement but without endorsement of human rights abuses.  Unlike
Republicans, they would be less inclined to use trade as weapon in this relationship nor try to
ban the export of dual use technologies, which they see as pointless and economically self
defeating.  Unlike the Clinton administration, Rice does not see China as a status quo power,
but a great power with unresolved regional aspirations, especially towards Taiwan and in the
South China Sea.  Thus, it is as a 'strategic competitor' not as a 'strategic partner' (of Clinton
administration language) that the US must deal with China.  Republicans, she argues, should
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see that China does not challenge the status quo, especially over Taiwan.32  Like
Democrat's, Republican's will want to assist with (read, force the pace on) China's internal
economic and political transition.  However, if Rice has her way, and Republican rhetoric is
underwritten in practice, then the US will 'confront Beijing' when interests collide, certainly
more than was the case under Clinton.33
Notwithstanding that Japan is a formal ally rather than a strategic competitor, a similar
reading of that relationship may be drawn--basically similar overall bi-partisan strategy but
with tactical differences in policy implementation.  Democrats argue for shielding the
security relationship from commercial tension and treating Japan as a partner in global
economic institutional reform as well as just a security ally.  High level bilateral dialogue will
be consolidated to make provision for airing complaints and avoiding confrontation; and
Japan will be encouraged to play a stronger security role in the Asia Pacific.  This view is
stated more strongly, and with a somewhat different emphasis by Republicans who want
much greater burden sharing in the Asia Pacific from Japan, although not necessarily a
greater joint leadership role.  It is also explicitly stated by Zoellick that a central aim of Japan
policy is to deter China.34
In their relations with Russia there is even less to choose between the details of their
respective policies.  Democrats want to continue constructive engagement in the economic
domain but with an emphasis 'wherever possible on multilateral institutions like the IMF'.  In
the context of a multi faceted policy, the security domain is the most important issue area
(Russia is economically too small to destabilise global economy, as the default of 1998
demonstrated).  Yet even for the Democrats, controlling Russia's nuclear arsenal 'must remain
the central focus of American policy'. 35
If Rice becomes the next secretary of state, the emphasis will be the same but the approach
somewhat different.  She thinks the US got too involved in Russia's internal problems.  'Lets
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... [she says] ... get out of domestic politics and ets get back to state to state great power
relationships'.36  She is correct to suggest that by failing to grasp the nettle of the domestic
corruption surrounding the Yeltsin administration, the US now has a credibility problem both
within the USSR and also with the American population.  'Russia Fatigue' is a danger.  But it
is difficult to believe that she can really be serious about getting out of Russian p li ics  If
one thing is certain under conditions of economic globalisation, it is that the divide that once
used to define the distinction between domestic and foreign policy no longer exists.  The
relationship between foreign policy and economic sovereignty is not that simple nowadays.
The enhanced power of the markets (especially the financial ones) at the expense of state
authority and the involvement of a range of non state actors (especially multinational
corporations) combine to make her desire to separate the 'domestic' from the 'international'
wistful at best.  Republicans may be critical of what has gone before under the Clinton
administration, but it is difficult to believe, should they be in office after November, that
there policy will be fundamentally, as opposed to atmospherically, different.  In addition,
both Republicans and Democrats alike view the election of Vladimir Putin as a double edged
sword (in more than one way).
On Europe, both parties recognise the major commonalities of interest that exist between the
USA and the EU at the beginning of a new century, but it is clear that there are also
significant substantive difference of policy approach in a range of areas.  The outcome of the
US presidential election will have bearing on a number of these.  At a basic political level, a
Bush victory will break the link between social democratic (Third Way) Europe and
Democratic (Third way) Washington.  The passing of 'Blintonism' might be a bad thing for
Blairite Labour's trans-Atlantic foreign policy, but, to the extent that it might turn British
interests again more towards Europe, it may be a good thing for the longer term 'European
project'.
Specific policy areas, such as trade, demonstrate the commonality of the trans-Atlantic
interest, yet difference of policy approach exist.  US-EU trade and inv stment, based on
trans-Atlantic cooperation in economic, political and security spheres, and which grew
strongly during the Cold War, has lost little of its vitality over the last decade.  Trans-Atlantic
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trade now accounts for close to 20 percent of each o hers exports and imports.  Yet, policy
differences and trade disputes grow; be it over hormone-injected beef, bananas, information
technology, GM foods or the US recourse to unilateral extra-territorial economic sanctions, in
defiance of a rules based trading system, for political purposes (as with non US firms dealing
with Cuba)37
While international institutional settings, especially the WTO, have proved useful in
resolving past problems, they seem less equipped to deal with current ones.  The dispute
settlement process at the WTO that were supported by both the US and Europe have turned
US-EU disputes into strongly contested (and at times quite bitter) tests for trade rules and
struggles for market access.  Indeed, the amount of trade at stake is often of less significance
than the political rhetoric.38 Whatever the merits of the individual cases, and Europe often
drags the chain on responding to WTO rulings, there can be little doubt that the US has
attempted to turn the WTO into an instrument of coercive economic diplomacy.
Similar tensions can also be seen at the World Bank and the IMF where growing differences
of philosophy between Anglo-American (neo-liberal) and continental European (social
democratic) perspectives on economic management came into sharp focus throughout the
closing years of the twentieth century.  Notwithstanding a common desire to continue the
process of global economic liberalisation, this difference is reflected in the competing views
of how to deal with those left behind by globalisation.  Specifically, there is a sharp
philosophical difference over the role of social welfare under conditions of globalisation that
prevails in the two systems.39
Similar philosophical difference can be seen in the US desire for a laissez faire approach to
the regulation of electronic data, which contrasts sharply with a European preference for the
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protection of privacy.  Yet other than platitudes about the importance of the relationship and
the need to nurture it, neither Democrats nor Republicans have really spelled out how they
propose to deal with Europe on such issues over the period of the next administration.  The
preceding questions are not trivial, and they are made all the more difficult because they are
not simply issue-specific, they are also philosophical-cum-ideological.
A similar dilemma pertains in the security domain.  Rice identifies the problem and does so
in a manner that differs little from that of Democrats.  As she correctly points out, in the
absence of a Soviet threat and in the wake of the Kosovo intervention, a redefinition of the
trans Atlantic alliance is required.  While welcoming its enlargement, NATO, she argues, is
in danger of losing its identity and sense of mission.40  Unfortunately Rice, and Democrat
analysts alike, apart from asserting US interest in the process, ar  silent on how this identity
and mission is to be regenerated.
                                                
40 Rice, p. 54
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Conclusion
This paper has made no attempt to provide a comprehensive review of the US foreign policy
agenda.  Rather it has attempted to look at the major constraints and opportunities that might
face an incoming president inheriting the legacy of the Clinton administration.  In so doing, it
has addressed big picture, structural questions about the nature of US power in the post Cold
War, globalised, era.  It has demonstrated the importance of US preponderance in the
economic and security 'hard power' domains, but also identified the salience of what Joseph
Nye has labelled soft power.  This hard power-soft power dichotomy is of considerable
analytical utility for any discussion of US foreign policy after November; especially when
looked at through Republican lenses.
Nye argued that US soft power works not only bilaterally, but also through its predominance
in the international organisations if, but only if, US policy positions are morally based and
committed to building a consensus around them.  For the moment at least, it seems to be lost
on Bush and his team that there is a limit to the utility of hard power in contemporary
international, especially institutional, settings.  In the context of Cold War disciplines, the use
of hard power to influence policy may have been acceptable to most states who saw the US
as preferable to the alternative.  But what was good for Ronald Reagan in a Cold War context
might not be so good for George Bush Jr now.  Appeals to the days of the Reagan era might
evoke a warm glow amongst contemporary Republican's, but the structural contexts are
different.  Bullying, in theory and practice, diminishes US soft power.  The downside of
current US preponderance is that it causes others to wish to balance against it.
While US soft power predominates 'counter balancing' may be avoided.  But if other
international actors think that the US is resorting too frequently to the use of hard power,
especially in the economic domain, this situation may not prevail.  Bush's foreign policy
prognostications in the run up to the election are every bit as domestically politically
instrumental s those the Republicans have rightly criticised Clinton for over the last few
years.  They offer little comfort to America's international partners  As Nye, admittedly from
a Democratic perspective, recently opined ' ... it would be a pity if the unilateralist rhetoric of
an election year led America to squander its soft power and to feed its enemies.'41
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More objectively, a recent study from the Institute of Diplomacy at Georgetown University
demonstrates how an Administration in a perpetual state of mutual mistrust with Congress
has been progressively unable to provide high quality statesmanship and diplomacy on a
range of important foreign policy initiatives throughout the 1990s.  Not only has the US had a
minority Presidency--given the Republican majority in Congress--there has been a marked
trend within Congress towards a reduced focus on, and the provision of increasingly
constrained resources for, foreign policy matters.  Expertise has declined in a number of
ways.  Notably, over the 1990s, 50 members of the Senate and 353 members of the House
were newly elected.  The impact of this has been to diminish the expertise and leadership
potential of the once important Authorising Committees.  Over the decade they have
increasingly played second fiddle to the more narrowly, fiscally focused, Appropriating
Committees.42
This could be a problem.  The first decade after the Cold War was clearly the decade of
economic globalisation.  Foreign policy, in the more traditional, geopolitical sense is likely to
matter more in the second post Cold War decade.  For example, stalled peace talks in the
Middle East, stalled peace processes in Northern Ireland, the demise of the CTBT and the
aborted new MTN Round after Seattle will all ensure the heightened salience of foreign
policy questions in American politics after the election.
But all these issue-specific questions are dwarfed by three big, related, and unresolved
intellectual-cum-philosophical questions of the post Cold War era: (i) How to accentuate the
positive and mitigate the negative effects of the US's unrivalled preponderance? (ii) What to
think about the nature of contemporary state sovereignty--the central pillar that has
underscored the international system since the Peace of Westphalia (in theoretical terms at
least) and that has been brought into question by humanitarian interventions in Kosovo and
East Timor? (iii) How to govern globalisation in such a way as to avoid massive polarisation
between the haves and haves not of this process?  The Clinton era, driven by domestic
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political considerations, has provided no signpost for how to think about any of these wider
issues and at this stage neither have the two contenders for his job.
Thus the basic conclusion of this analysis is not very original or startling.  There will be
considerable continuity to US foreign policy after the November 2000 election.  Policy
advisers on both sides of the fence, in their less partisan moments, clearly recognise the
manner in which global economic and politico-strategic interests under conditions of
globalisation are inseparable and that they have to be responded to as such.  They also
recognise that for all the isolationist impulses of American opinion, engagement with, not
retreat from, the international agenda will be the order of the day.  Moreover, both are
committed, rhetorically at least, to the notion of US leadership.  Where the difference
between them will be found is in the manner in which they engage and the manner in which
they attempt to lead.
